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ABSTRACT
This article maintains that the price for inclusion in the World Summit on the
Information Society – which finally has been achieved through the Working Group
on Internet Governance (WGIG) – has been the erosion of an oppositional civil
society within the summit itself. Specifically, it evaluates the development of the
WGIG as a manifestation of global neo-corporatism. In doing so, the article
addresses recurrent patterns within neo-corporatist policy concertation that is
oriented toward satisfying neoliberal economic imperatives. The objective of this
article is to provide an analysis of processes by which the diversity of interest
representation that was characteristic of the first phase of the WSIS has become
condensed into one agenda item focused on internet governance.
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Introduction
During the past 15 years, the United Nations has hosted a series of conferences and
summits calling attention to the need for poverty reduction, environmental
awareness, human rights, the elimination of racism, and the empowerment of
women, indigenous peoples, and youth. At their best, many of these events have
worked to increase awareness of both global interconnections and disparities in
resources. At their worst, many of these events have produced impressivesounding declarations that are cast aside and action plans that never reach the
implementation stage (Falk, 1998: 323). The World Summit on the Information

Society (WSIS) is the most recent of these UN-sponsored events. At the time of
writing, the second phase of the WSIS is underway, with a final meeting to be held
in Tunis, Tunisia in November 2005, and so it is not possible to address adequately
the question of whether this summit will follow or diverge from the prevailing
patterns of past UN events. However, it is possible – even in a context in which the
target is a moving one – to attempt a critical evaluation of the formation of the
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which was mandated by the WSIS
Declaration of Principles and is arguably one of the few concrete actions to follow
from the work performed during the first phase of the WSIS.
Since the inception of the WGIG, numerous entities, including the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the Conference of
Nongovernmental Organizations (CONGO), the UN NGO Liaison Service, members
of the Internet Governance Caucus, and members of the WGIG, have reiterated the
refrain that the working group represents a ‘best practice’ case for openness,
inclusiveness, and transparency, one which models the potential for bottom-up
modalities at the UN. Still, the claim to inclusion becomes compromised with the
knowledge that, in the end, the manifold concerns that had consumed negotiations
during the first phase of the WSIS had been whittled down to two agenda items,
internet governance and financing mechanisms, with the former eliciting the most
attention among stakeholders. The idea that a Digital Solidarity Fund might invite
sufficient support to become viable seems to have evaporated once it became
apparent that the proposed initiative enjoyed little support among the nations of
the ‘industrialized North’. For all practical purposes, internet governance appears
to be the only issue remaining on the official, inter-governmental WSIS table.
This should come as no surprise to anyone who recognized that the WSIS
would fall short as a forum for a pluralistic discussion on global communication
policies. Notwithstanding the active involvement of advocates for community radio
projects, press freedom, cultural diversity, and communication rights, the most
powerful stakeholders representing governments, UN agencies, and the private
sector had a pre-set, neoliberal agenda focused on ‘harnessing the power’ of new
information technologies, particularly the internet, in order to ‘unleash the
entrepreneurial spirit’ of peoples in lesser developed countries through ‘estrategies’, while addressing social needs such as healthcare and education through
‘e-health’ and ‘e-education’ initiatives.1 As the first phase of the WSIS unfolded, it
became clear that, above all else, this was the ‘internet summit’.

In this article, we situate the mission of the WGIG within a larger milieu that
illuminates what is happening in respect to global communication policy in general
and internet governance in particular. In the following pages, we place our
approach to the WGIG within a theoretical framework which draws from a critique
of neo-corporatist policy arrangements that are oriented to satisfying neoliberal
economic imperatives. Neo-corporatism is the contemporary version of a
longstanding approach to policymaking known as corporatism. As a strategy for
policy concertation, corporatism was originally adopted to maintain social
equilibrium in the welfare state by welcoming labor unions into cooperative
relations with business interests and the state on matters of economic policymaking. Now, this policy strategy has ‘gone global’ and has been reinvented as a
way of mainstreaming civil society into the policy processes of the UN (McLaughlin,
2004).
Our purpose is not to challenge the status of internet governance as a critical
issue to address within the context of the WSIS. Rather, it is to move beyond the
rhetoric of ‘openness and inclusion’ that surrounds the WGIG in order to
understand how the emphasis on internet governance, and therefore the creation
of a working group formed around this issue, has been produced through the
complex interplay among mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that characterizes
global neo-corporatist policy concertation.
The Working Group on Internet Governance
On 12 December 2003, during the week of events that marked the conclusion of
the first phase of the WSIS, the ITU issued a news release, which, although selfcongratulatory about the summit’s accomplishments, pointed to two unresolved
issues. One of these was the question of how internet governance should be
approached, with a primary focus on whether the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or another UN agency – most likely the ITU
– should have responsibility for technical management of internet activities such as
overseeing the domain naming system (DNS). Governmental negotiations had
failed to produce a consensus on matters related to technical and public policy
dimensions of internet governance during the first phase of the summit. Therefore,
the WSIS Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action requested that Secretary-

General Kofi Annan form a Working Group on Internet Governance to facilitate
negotiations during the second phase of the summit.
The WGIG was specifically charged with defining ‘Internet Governance’,
identifying relevant public policy issues and developing ‘a common understanding
of the respective roles and responsibilities of governments, existing international
organizations and other forums as well as the private sector and civil society from
both developing and developed countries’ (WSIS, 2003). Assigned the task to
‘investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of
the internet by 2005’, the WGIG’s primary deliverable is a report due out in July
2005. The proposal will be presented for ‘consideration and appropriate action’ at
the conclusion of the second phase of the WSIS in Tunis in November 2005
(www.wgig.org).2
Consultations regarding the formation of the WGIG commenced in early
2004 and were spread across numerous international fora that were purportedly
held in an ‘open mode’, allowing for wide participation from the tripartite
configuration of civil society, governments and private sector entities. Markus
Kummer, the Swiss diplomat who was appointed coordinator of the WGIG, voiced
his support for an ‘open and inclusive’ process in which selection of members
would be conducted in such a manner that representatives from the triad of
governments, civil society, and the private sector would each comprise roughly
one-third of the membership. The WGIG secretariat began in July of 2004, chaired
by Nitin Desai, special Advisor to the Secretary-General for the WSIS. The WGIG
agreed to schedule four ‘open and inclusive’ meetings oriented to maximizing
transparency. Because the WGIG was constituted primarily as a ‘fact-finding’
working group and not a negotiating body, there was a degree of tentativeness to
its discussions from the start. Some discussions have occurred online, while others
have taken the form of both closed private sessions and open sessions meant to
allow non-members to observe proceedings. In respect to the latter, observers
have not been guaranteed speaking privileges.
As a starting point, the WGIG identified as key issues the equitable
distribution of resources, access for all, stable and secure functioning of the
internet, and multilingualism and content. The first two WGIG meetings, held in
November 2004 and February 2005, yielded a preliminary draft structure for its
report, identified public policy issues, and produced a concrete timeframe for its
work. A series of draft papers were submitted for consideration and are available

on the WGIG website. Discussions at WGIG meetings generated several collective
observations on internet governance, including that governance cannot be reduced
to ‘government activities’ and internet governance encompasses a wider range of
issues than simply internet protocol numbering and domain name administration.
Members also agreed that there must be a practical basis for distinguishing
between technical and public policy issues. The working group agreed to take up
four key issues, which were clustered as follows:
• Issues relating to infrastructural issues and the management of critical internet
resources, including administration of the domain name system and IP
addresses, administration of the root server system, technical standards, peering
and inter-connection, telecommunications infrastructure including innovative
and converged technologies, as well as multilingualization
• Issues relating to the use of the internet, including spam, network security, and
cybercrime
• Issues which are relevant to the internet, but with impact much wider than the
internet, where there are existing organizations responsible for these issues,
such as IPR or international trade
• Issues relating to developmental aspects of internet governance, in particular
capacity building in developing countries, gender issues and other access
concerns (Working Group on Internet Governance, 2004–5).
As the WGIG’s issue clusters indicate, the decision was made to take an
expansive approach so long as doing so would not render meaningless the
definition of ‘internet governance’ (Peake, 2004). This is in contrast to definitions
of internet governance restricted to the workings of ICANN, a subject that is both
technical and political but which seems to invite a focus on issues related to
technical coordination of the internet via a specific organization. Still, there is no
denying that government negotiations on internet governance during the first
phase of the summit were centered primarily on ICANN and that the principal item
on the agenda of the WGIG would be the administration of the domain name
system, IP addresses, and the root server system.
ICANN was a contentious issue throughout the first phase of the WSIS and a
main motivation for discussion, as representatives primarily from countries of the
global South challenged its role in internet governance. ICANN is a private,

nonprofit entity formed under California state law in 1998 after four years of
protracted debate over the technical management of internet activities such as the
domain naming system (DNS). The specific set of functions assigned to ICANN by
the US Department of Commerce’s ‘memorandum of understanding’ gave it the
authority to set policy for, and to manage the allocation and assignment of, internet
protocol addresses, add new names to the top level of the internet domain name
hierarchy, and maintain responsibility for operating root servers that distribute
authoritative information about the content of the top level of the domain name
space (Mueller, 2002). In choosing who is entitled to a specific domain name and
determining the number of IP addresses made available to particular regions and
nations, ICANN has authority over the allocation of a scarce resource within the
IPV4 system.3 ICANN also has the power to authorize the ways in which domain
name disputes are resolved through its Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy. These arrangements give ICANN a broad authority with far-reaching
implications that have become increasingly controversial.
Seen by many in the international community as the province of a small
technocratic elite with ties to the US Department of Commerce, ICANN increasingly
has come under fire for its lack of transparency and accountability and Westerncentric mode of governance. Furthermore, ICANN has generated controversy by its
seemingly arbitrary and disproportionate allotment of highly coveted top-level
domains (TLD) and internet protocol addresses that seem to privilege developed
nations over developing ones. Most recently, ICANN sparked controversy by
granting a top level .xxx domain name to an independent company, run by a British
businessman, that will make it available for pornographic web content. This topic
was cited by WGIG members, especially representatives from developing countries,
in calling into question ICANN’s legitimacy as an arbiter of culturally sensitive
issues.
Building upon earlier discussions, at the third meeting in April 2005, the
WGIG focused on ‘capacity building’ in developing countries and began drafting a
questionnaire that sought input as a basis for the development of policy
recommendations or proposals for action. This questionnaire focused on four
topics: the need for an international forum; the oversight of internet governance
and whether ICANN and the Government Advisory Committee (GAC) for ICANN
should be replaced or transformed; the function and coordination of existing

institutions; and how these processes might be coordinated between national and
international decision-making arrangements.
The fourth and last meeting held in June was devoted to evaluating feedback
from the questionnaire. According to transcripts from the meeting made available
on the WGIG site, several representatives, especially those from the global South,
expressed opinions that a new governance body was needed to replace ICANN.
Also predictably, WGIG members from the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), whose representative works
for IBM, suggested that the current state of affairs was optimal and that the unique
nature of the internet naturally gives rise to a user-driven democracy that was not
amenable to centralized regulation. The opinions of representatives from these
two organizations reinforce the position of the United States, whose State
Department has released statements which welcome international dialogue and
cooperation on matters of internet governance while remaining adamant that
ICANN is the indisputably best model for technical management of the domain
system.
In prescriptive documents such as ‘The United States Approach to the
Internet: Guiding Principles for the UN Working Group on Internet Governance’
(United States State Department, 2005), the US has advocated an approach that
supports private sector leadership in internet development, adopts a market-based
framework for internet governance, and offers universal access through private
investment and competition. Perhaps ironically, the State Department also warned
against adopting overly prescriptive approaches to internet regulation.
Neo-corporatism@wgig.wsis.int
Despite the stress on internet governance during the second phase of the WSIS, it
is important to emphasize that none of the other issues that were addressed during
the first phase have gone away. Some civil society organizations whose concerns
were not addressed adequately during the earlier phase – groups that focus on
issues related to gender, indigenous people, cultural diversity, human rights, and
trade – have parted ways with the official process and have pursued dialogue and
action in other, generally more open, fora.4 Other civil society organizations, some
of which represent the above-listed interests, have remained tied to the WSIS, but,
as Raboy (2005) points out, the various working groups and thematic caucuses now

seem more institutionalized and bureaucratized than they were during the first
phase.
One trend that seems to be emerging among the remaining WSIS civil society
groups is that many interests and issues are being channeled toward questions of
internet governance. For example, the WSIS Gender Caucus Statement on Internet
Governance, in welcoming the establishment of the WGIG and commending it for
its adherence to a multi-stakeholder approach, requests that the WGIG ground its
work in a framework based in human rights and development, gender balance, and
the fostering of creativity, innovation, linguistic diversity, and social inclusion. The
Gender Caucus’s call for an approach to internet governance grounded in such a
framework is compelling and necessary, and, in addition, it might be considered a
well-thought out strategy for the group to assert its relevance during a phase in
which internet governance has been identified as particularly germane to
governmental negotiations about the future of the ‘information society’. Surely,
‘internet governance’ is relevant to human development today. However,
bolstering a view of internet governance as a singularly important issue risks
fortifying the established government and private sector view that access to new
information and communication technologies is the panacea for closing the
development divide.
This sort of narrow, neoliberal notion of the ‘information society’ was
rejected by civil society stakeholders in their very own declaration. During phase
one of the WSIS, a great source of frustration for civil society was that, regardless
of its numerous critical interventions, each government draft of the Declaration of
Principles and Plan of Action appeared more technocratic and oriented to marketled solutions to development than its predecessor. Finally, civil society agreed to
craft its own declaration, ‘Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs’, which
was adopted unanimously by its members during the December 2003 summit (Civil
Society Declaration, 2003). The Civil Society Declaration eschews the technologicaldeterministic notion that overcoming a specifically ‘digital’ divide is the answer to
development: ‘The unequal distribution of ICTs and the lack of information access
for a large majority of the world’s population, often referred to as the digital divide,
is in fact a mapping of new asymmetries onto the existing grid of social divides’
(Civil Society Declaration, 2003: 7). In addition, the Declaration cautions that
traditional broadcast media such as radio and television are often the most efficient
means of providing necessary information within developing countries.

Nevertheless, many civil society members who have continued to engage in
official WSIS spaces are devoting a majority of their efforts toward carrying on with
the governmental agenda, which does not necessarily diverge a great deal from
their own respective agendas. Clearly, the majority of civil society activity taking
place in connection with the second phase of the WSIS has been oriented to
internet governance. Concurrently, many civil society members appear to have
developed amnesia in respect to the breadth of what occurred during phase one.
This has facilitated a scenario in which the conditions for civil society’s concession
to the official, predetermined WSIS agenda are already in place.
The risk of civil society’s experiencing an erosion of its oppositional edge in
the face of assimilation may have been inferred in advance of the WSIS. Despite
the discourse of ‘the new’ that has characterized the official pronouncements
made during the WSIS process, we maintain that the summit’s multi-stakeholder
modalities represent a supranational version of neo-corporatism. In 2003, the ITU
Civil Society Secretariat’s web site described the WSIS as a ‘Governmental PLUS
summit’ that will provide the paradigm for ‘new governance in the Information
Society’. Perhaps more accurately, the mode of policy coordination set into motion
by the WSIS is a new reinvention of an older policy scheme known as corporatism.
The goal of corporatism traditionally has been to promote social integration and
stability within highly advanced capitalist economies by creating cooperative
arrangements among a limited set of conflicting social groups (Lehmbruch, 1984).
Corporatist approaches have generally been applied to economic policy-making as
a bargaining mechanism between the state and leaders of organized interest
groups defined in class categories, with labor unions and business associations
being the state’s key partners in this effort to promote class collaboration and ward
off class conflicts which would otherwise challenge national political and economic
interests.
Concurrent with the growing influence of civil society organizations
throughout the various 1990s UN-sponsored meetings, corporatism has taken on
new relevance as the basis for understanding how policymaking procedures have
been adjusted to meet the challenge posed by new political actors exercising
authority within institutions of global governance. As the influence of labor unions
has eroded and the power of groups promoting so-called ‘postindustrial’ themes
such as environmental protection, consumer rights, and women’s rights has

increased, corporatist states have created bargaining arrangements with the new
interest groups as well.5
Global neo-corporatism, despite diverging from traditional corporatism in
some significant ways, is serving a purpose that is similar to that of the latter, with
the UN responding to NGO challenges to international institutions and
transnational corporations by promoting cooperative arrangements among
international organizations, business, and civil society in an attempt to defuse
radical opposition by co-opting more moderate groups (Dryzek, 2000; Offe, 1990;
Ottaway, 2001). Liberal constitutionalists and some left-leaning critics are apt to be
critical of corporatism, the former because it is an exclusionary approach that
circumvents deliberative democracy and elected government and the latter
because current neo-corporatist arrangements marginalize the working class and
tend to guide progressive causes toward entrapment within the net of capitalist
bureaucracies, whether at the national or supranational level.
Conservatives such as Ottaway (2001) take a sceptical, and yet very different,
view toward neo-corporatism, suggesting that global neo-corporatist policy
arrangements have been forced upon the UN and the private sector because of
demands that are made by civil society organizations making unsubstantiated
claims to represent larger constituencies. Following from this, Ottaway suggests
that the UN, as a sort of quasi-state, has been co-opted by civil society. In her
conception, the corporatist state, or quasi-state represented by the UN, is the head
of the body politic because it takes on the task of coordinating and reconciling the
interests of the three sectors: the state, the market, and civil society. In contrast,
the evolution of the WSIS towards a conclusion in which internet governance has
taken center stage reinforces the argument that, within today’s tripartite forms of
policy concertation, the market has become the head of the body politic
(McLaughlin, 2004).
This claim is not meant to suggest that the nation-state has become
irrelevant. Rather, it is to maintain that, whether willingly or not, the majority of
nation-states have shifted their priorities from meeting the social and economic
needs of their various constituencies to satisfying the economic interests of multinational corporations and wealthy social classes (Keane, 1998: 34). Although the
tension between these two sets of priorities weighs heavily upon the UN, it is, after
all, an intergovernmental organization that tends to capitulate to the policy
positions held by its most powerful member-states.

As O Siochru has argued, by the time that preparations for the WSIS were
underway, the ITU had already fallen in line behind the neoliberal banner and had
‘swallowed undigested the ideologically-driven claims for the “information
society”’ (2004: 213). The ‘information society’ is a label suggesting a brave new
world marked by new dynamics and radical breaks with past relations – an
ideological assumption connected to earlier post-industrial and neoliberal rhetorics
that privilege easily commodified information over communication processes.
Fortunately, for those who embrace this view of the ‘information society’, the
dominant discourse about the internet avoids mention of it as a primary site for the
development of informationalized capitalism (Dean, 2003; Schiller, 1999). Rather,
as Preston (2001: 6) points out, it is more fashionable in our new millennium ‘to
admire and enthuse over technology and its presumed social or economic benefits’.
At a time when it is not practicable for governments to de-link from neoliberal
globalization, visions based in technocratic and market-led approaches to
development arrive packaged in the language of emancipation. Thus, the ITU Civil
Society Secretariat described the WSIS’s orientation as ‘not technical but related to
the advent of a globalized society in which the emancipation of the human being is
in part related to the possibilities of communication and exchange of information’
(WSIS, 2003).
In announcing the WSIS, the ITU offered a place at the table for all
stakeholders with interests in coordinating local, national, regional, and global
communication policies in order to overcome the ‘digital divide’ or ‘knowledge gap’
between industrialized and less developed countries. Nevertheless, it became
apparent early on that, in allegedly offering a venue in which all stakeholders were
welcomed, the WSIS process would unfold in such a way that, with few exceptions,
everyone would remain in their place. Much of this is due to the fact that the
summit was initiated with the impossible proposition that civil society and the
private sector would participate on an equal footing with governments, despite the
fact that: (1) the UN organization remains state-centric in its decision-making and
consensus-seeking negotiation processes; and (2) the majority of its memberstates have become instrumentalized by neoliberal economic imperatives.
The first of these confounds the use of neo-corporatist strategies as a way of
satisfying the (quasi-) state imperative of legitimation. Neo-corporatism wards off
threats to legitimation by bringing into deliberations various constituencies that
have the capability to destabilize the political economy. Legitimation is secured

when these groups agree to accept the political-economic structures that reinforce
the status quo (Dryzek, 2000: 96). Several of the governments that comprise the
UN successfully curtailed the full participation of civil society and the private sector
by, among other things, preventing attendance at ‘closed’ governmental plenary
sessions in Geneva and shortening civil society and private sector speaking slots at
these events to a few minutes. As O Siochru (2004: 214) notes, when compared
with governments, ‘civil society had a tougher task in bringing the wider issues and
the huge range of diverse actors together in a coherent manner during the
Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) and the Summit’. Yet, the shared
experience of exclusion, as well as the recognition that concerted efforts were
needed to expand the summit’s discourse beyond the most narrow, neoliberal
approaches to ‘the information society’, propelled disparate civil society groups to
work together in a more harmonious manner than what may have been expected
otherwise.
Much of civil society was placed in the position of having to devote significant
amounts of time to lobbying for inclusion, which took away from the time needed
to advocate for substantive, human-centered approaches to overcoming the
development divide. Nevertheless, while the recognition that the ITU had reneged
on its promissory note provoked a struggle for access to WSIS proceedings, there
appears to have been far less consideration devoted to the possibility that there
might be costs to be paid for inclusion as well as exclusion. Drawing from Dryzek’s
(2000) cogent description of (neo-) corporatism, we wish to focus on the key peril
associated with inclusion in current policy deliberations. Although initial multistakeholder invitations may be extended in the spirit of pluralistic dialogue, neocorporatist concertation both begins and ends with passive exclusions that are
determined by virtue of which groups satisfy or threaten existing economic
imperatives. First and foremost, the imperatives of states – and, by extension, the
imperatives of the UN – are oriented to avoiding economic crises and maximizing
accumulation. This imperative cannot be satisfied through redistributive policies
because they ‘frighten the markets’ (Dryzek, 2000: 83). Consequently, however
much they might satisfy the legitimation imperative, pluralistic approaches
eventually corrode into the marginalization of groups whose aims do not coincide
with the demands of the neoliberal economic imperative.6
It is crucial to point out that such forms of exclusion are not simply imposed
upon civil society. Rather, civil society tends to become a partner, although perhaps

an irresolute partner, with governments and the private sector inasmuch as it
develops internal hierarchical structures that produce a leadership that
governments recognize as a partner (Dryzek, 2000: 97). But, because governments
depend on corporations to keep the economy afloat through investments, business
inexorably occupies a privileged position in policy deliberations (Dryzek, 2000: 18).
As such, to qualify for government recognition as negotiating partners, civil society
organizations must have accepted, or at least be willing to court, the idea that a
‘win-win situation’ might result from consultations with both governments and the
private sector. In this respect, the WGIG is perhaps the ‘dream team’ of most
governments and the private sector. In order to enjoy the opportunity of
participating in the working group, civil society representatives were required to
accept the notion that the group is no more than a ‘neutral’, ‘fact-finding’ body. In
addition, the WGIG is just inclusive enough to fulfill some of the most superficial
requirements of representation.
To be sure, the Internet Governance Caucus, as the coordinating body for the
civil society’s nominations to the WGIG, as well as WGIG chair Markus Kummer,
made good faith efforts to build openness, inclusiveness, and transparency into the
process of choosing members of the working group. Internet Governance Caucus
coordinators reported in June 2004 that Kummer would take a broad view toward
internet governance and place high value on the diversity of the membership,
attempting to achieve a balance between those representing developing and
developed countries and highlighting the need for gender balance in particular. In
addition, he indicated that criteria for inclusion on the WGIG would favor one’s
having internet governance expertise over a person’s occupying a ‘high-level’
position. Similarly, the Internet Governance Caucus (2004), in its document titled
‘Recommendations on the General Structure and Operating Principles for the
Working Group on Internet Governance’, requested balance in representation
between participants from the three sectors that comprised WSIS stakeholders and
advocated for both diversity and the requisite experience in internet governance,
with particular attention to regional and gender diversity.
At the conclusion of the nomination process, the civil society members who
remained involved in the WSIS process could claim some victories in respect to the
constitution of the WGIG: nearly all civil society nominees were accepted as
members of the group, civil society representatives constituted roughly one-third
of the membership of the WGIG, and (however imperfect) something of a balance

among the various regions of the world had been achieved. Nevertheless, it is
notable that only one-eighth of the 40 members of the WGIG are women, thus
emphasizing that the nomination process had failed miserably in fulfilling one of its
missions. In its statement made in conjunction with the June 2005 meeting of the
WGIG, the Gender Caucus stated that ‘we are distressed to find that the large
number of papers published to date by the WGIG have only given gender the barest
mention’ (Gender Caucus, 2005: 1).
But, there is far more to understanding forms of inclusion and exclusion than
what might be gauged by calculating percentages and counting the number of
times that ‘gender balance’ is mentioned in a document. Following the first phase
of the WSIS, the Gender Caucus reported that the group’s main recommendations
had been incorporated into the WSIS ‘Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action’.
Yet, the WSIS Declaration of Principles includes only a few references to women’s
empowerment, gender equality, opportunities for women, and women and girls as
‘special needs’ populations. The Plan of Action, adopted by the governments on
the same day, features a couple of references to gender equality and inclusion, and,
yet, in comparison to the Declaration, includes far more references to women and
gender. There are consistent references to gender and/or women and ICT careers,
employment opportunities in the IT sector, unleashing women’s entrepreneurial
skills and enhancing ICT innovation through women’s training and capacitybuilding. There are many references to women as informational labor but no
references to educating women so that they might become familiar with the
diverse policy approaches to internet governance.
Conclusion
So, what is bottom-up about internet governance? Despite the self-congratulatory
tone of the few missives that have been shared with the rest of civil society by
members of the WGIG, the requirement that its members have professional and
technical expertise in internet governance guarantees that they are not emissaries
representing ‘globalization from below’.7 As with the rest of us who have been able
to partake in the WSIS process in Geneva, and now Tunis, the members of the WGIG
are more educated and privileged than the majority of members of their respective
societies. The seemingly de facto requirement that the majority of the WGIG’s
membership has a grasp on the important, and yet arcane, machinations and

language of ICANN not only buttresses the distinction between the WGIG’s civil
society representatives and ‘the bottom’, but also hinders communication between
internet governance experts and the remnants of civil society that are still hoping
to use the WSIS as a forum for eliminating the development divide. In the end, it is
at best utopian and at worst a conceit to make claims to represent the barely
existent ‘globalization from below’ (Waterman, 2003).
As of June 2005, the WGIG’s reported output has resulted primarily in
procedural outcomes relevant to the coordination of the group’s efforts to
document approaches to internet governance. The WGIG has garnered
considerable praise for its accomplishments, notwithstanding the fact that the full
content of the group’s discussions during closed meetings has not been disclosed,
and in the absence of a final report of the group’s findings and recommendations.
Civil society members – notably those who were on the nominating committee for
the WGIG and those who are members of the WGIG – have cited the WGIG as a
‘best practice’ example in itself and as a model for multi-stakeholder partnership
relations in general. In this sense, the group that was mandated to become the
most active among WSIS civil society stakeholders now mimics the ways of its
sponsoring body, the UN, which prematurely celebrated its victory in respect to the
WSIS. This is evidenced by the ITU Civil Society Secretariat’s earliest website
remarks. More than a year in advance of the conclusion of the first phase of the
WSIS, the Secretariat announced that the ‘new governance in the Information
Society’ will be modeled by ‘the modalities of [the WSIS’s] open process’ in which
states, intergovernmental institutions, civil society, and the private sector will
engage in a ‘new dialogue’ as partners (Civil Society Secretariat, 2003).8
Over two years later, on the date on which we have finished writing this
article, and one day prior to that on which the WGIG report is to be completed, the
US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has
announced that, on the basis of moral and economic imperatives, the US will not
relinquish oversight of root server administration to a private or public
international body. According to the NTIA report, ‘the United States will continue
to support market-based approaches and private sector leadership in Internet
development broadly’ (NTIA, 2005). In the wake of this new development based in
the old doctrine of US supremacy, perhaps it is time to think about the ways in
which exclusionary mechanisms can benefit democracy by producing an

oppositional civil society that does not risk becoming paralyzed through
bureaucratization and institutionalization.
Notes
1 Despite the use of quotation marks, these various ‘e-references’ are not
attributable to any one source. Rather, they are meant to draw attention to
technophilic expressions that have become commonplace in UN and other
governmental venues – language that, by the way, mimics that of the market.
2 This article was written prior to the dissemination of the completed WGIG report.
As a result, our focus is on the process by which the WGIG was formed, along
with the activities in which the group engaged from its inception until 30 June
2005.
3 It should be noted that this ‘scarce resource’ is artificially scarce. If and when the
international community agrees to move to the IPV6 system, potential IP
numbers will increase exponentially and negate any risk of scarcity.
4 Examples include events sponsored by the Communication Rights in the
Information Society (CRIS) campaign and OurMedia/NuestrosMedia, as well as
the World Social Forum and Incommunicado 05.
5 Streeck (1984), for example, writes that, even prior to its adoption as a policy
strategy contained within certain European countries in the 1970s, neocorporatism was proposed as a model for organized interests within an
integrated European polity so as to govern a ‘mixed economy’. The forms of
policy concertation that characterize the current European Union also are largely
corporatist arrangements.
6 As Hunold (2001) describes, pluralist and corporatist approaches to policy
concertation have become more compatible in contemporary times, whereas, in
the past, they have been understood to be competing forms of policymaking.
7 Neo-corporatism prizes involvement by those who are able to abide by the rules
of technical and professional expertise as a method for avoiding social conflict
and disruption (Streeck, 1984).
8 For comments on the erasure of political questions from WSIS discourse, see
Hamelink (2004).
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